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Intermediaries’ perspectives on the public’s role in the energy transitions needed 
to deliver UK climate change policy goals. 
 
Abstract  
There is now a large body of research into public understanding of climate change and 
energy challenges. There is however little empirical examination of how actors from 
politics, government, civil society and non-governmental organisations regard the role of 
public engagement in climate and energy policy. Research is lacking as to their views on 
the desirability of active citizen participation or indeed whether they draw on the findings 
from social science research in forming strategies and policy. This paper presents an 
analysis of interviews with policy experts and deliberative seminars held with non-
governmental stakeholders working in the climate change sphere. A comparison of four 
policy scenarios was used to explore stakeholders’ beliefs about the role of the public in 
delivering the UK’s Climate Change Act targets. The results reveal a general antipathy to 
policies that seek to ‘engage’ the public and a lack of knowledge amongst the participants 
about how insights from the social sciences can be used to build and sustain public 
engagement. This research exposes the need to assess the means by which public 
engagement can better be understood, integrated and most effectively utilised for 
sustainable progression towards climate targets. 
Keywords: Tax; Policy; Intermediaries; Quotas; Participation;  
Targets 
1. Introduction 
 
The fourth budget of the UK Climate Change Act requires 50% CO2e emissions reduction 
by 2025, in line with a longer-term target of 80% reductions by 2050 (UK Committee on 
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Climate Change, 2008). This equates to a 3% reduction in emissions every year from 
2014 to 2030 (UK Committee on Climate Change, 2015). To meet these targets the UK 
faces ‘an urgent need for completely new energy policy across a range of areas’ (UK 
Committee on Climate Change, 2016). It is thought by many that a reliance upon 
individual-level voluntary behavioural responses by the wider public can only make a 
limited contribution to meeting those targets (Capstick et al. 2014; Shove, 2010; Capstick 
et al. 2015; Chamberlin et al. 2015). At the same time there has, to date, been political 
reluctance in the UK to introduce more radical top-down policies to structure emissions 
reduction, such as carbon taxation or personal carbon trading (Chamberlin et al. 2015; 
Lorenzoni et al. 2008).  
 
The impasse in climate and energy policy which prevents more radical emissions 
reductions has been termed the ‘governance trap’: a situation in which people are 
concerned about climate change, but feel it is for policy makers to take the lead on 
implementing the required changes; while, in turn, policy makers expect individuals to act, 
and are unwilling to implement potentially unpopular measures (Pidgeon, 2012). In this 
context, an understanding of how the public is viewed by policy makers and intermediaries 
(for example, stakeholders from civil society), together with the capacity of government 
and policy to actively engage the public, is central to overcoming the governance trap. By 
translating scientific knowledge and their own perspectives into popular discourse, as well 
as by amplifying risk claims (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005) non-governmental and civil 
society actors are critical to shaping public opinion on climate change and energy topics, 
and in the setting of assumptions about the nature of public engagement on these issues 
(Ockwell et al. 2009; Carter and Ockwell, 2007; Brulle et al. 2012) 
 
The active shaping of both public and policy opinion is particularly important given the 
continued focus on climate change ‘scepticism’ among the public and in media reporting, 
which has, over time, contributed to the impression that civil society is disinterested or 
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even hostile to climate protection (Howarth and Sharman, 2015). Fluctuations in public 
opinion, particularly declines in key indicators of risk perception in the late 2000’s across 
Western nations, has led some observers to conclude that climate change had become 
an issue of secondary importance to many (Kerr, 2011). In addition, the political 
consensus in the UK about the importance of climate change has waned following the 
banking crisis of 2008 (Carter and Clements, 2015). Nonetheless, in nationally 
representative social surveys, climate change consistently emerges as a matter of 
concern to majorities across Europe (European Commission, 2014; Steentjes et al. 2017) 
In the UK, around three-quarters of the public are in favour of national reductions in energy 
use, and of decreased reliance on fossil fuels (Butler et al. 2015) as well as greater use of 
renewable energy such as onshore wind (10:10, 2016). A range of research studies 
likewise suggests that there is a stronger mandate for government intervention than 
politicians have tended to assume (Pidgeon, 2012; Rickards et al. 2014).  
 
Policy intermediaries play a potentially important role in interpreting and using these data 
in order to provide realistic narratives within which policy makers have the license to act 
on climate change and the public have the capacity to engage. These narratives are likely 
to be complex in nature - although members of the public generally endorse a national 
response to climate change, the level of popular support for specific carbon reduction 
policies is highly variable, and contingent upon design features. There is only weak public 
support for policies such as personal carbon trading or carbon taxation in their generic 
form; however, their acceptability can be substantially increased when, for example, 
schemes emphasise equity considerations and the re-investment of revenues. Regard for 
fairness and social justice are similarly found to be important for public appraisals of 
energy transitions, alongside concerns for affordability, environmental protection and 
energy security (Butler et al. 2015). So, whilst the research indicates there is some 
appetite amongst the UK public for strong policy leadership on climate change, there is a 
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lack of understanding about what policy options, commensurate with 80% reductions, 
intermediaries would be willing to promote, and if, and how, their choices are related to 
their beliefs about public perceptions and engagement. In short, we know a lot about how 
the public perceive policy and policy-makers with respect to climate change, but next to 
nothing about how the intermediaries between the public and policy-makers, perceive the 
public’s role. 
 
1.1 What is the role of public engagement in delivering climate change policy? 
The feasibility of implementing ambitious policy is typically assumed to be contingent on 
the extent to which there is felt to be public engagement on, and concern about, energy 
and climate change (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). Drawing on principles from psychology 
and science communication we define public engagement as having three key 
components (Hilgard, 1980): cognitive (understanding/ knowledge), affective (emotion, 
interest and concern), and conative/behavioural (motivation for action). This implies that 
“it is not enough for people to know about climate change in order to be engaged; they 
also need to care about it, be motivated and able to take action” (Lorenzoni et al. 2007: 
446). 
 
There are several reasons why public engagement on climate change could be viewed as 
essential to meeting climate change targets. Firstly, high levels of public concern about 
climate change and awareness of national energy needs provides both the social licence 
for policy makers to act and implies the public accepts policy decisions which have already 
been taken (Whitmarsh et al. 2011; Shaw, 2015). In line with aspirations for a healthier 
democracy, engagement with the policy-making process also helps to enhance the work 
of current institutions and social relations in the context of energy and environmental 
concerns, by ensuring that the knowledge and policy created by these institutions is seen 
to be ‘credible, salient and legitimate’ (Cash et al. 2003: 8086). Secondly, strengthened 
public engagement can motivate participation in the structural and behavioural changes 
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required as a result of those policies (Carvalho and Peterson, 2012; Machin, 2013; Thorpe 
and Gregory, 2010; Shaw, 2014). Thirdly, it has been argued that citizen engagement with 
climate politics is indispensable to finding effective responses (Castell, 2010) on the basis 
that the inclusion of alternative problem definitions and forms of knowledge have the 
potential to generate new thinking about policy (Oppenheimer, 2005; Hampton, 2009; 
Rayner, 1987; Ravetz, 2006). Fourthly, living in a democracy means people have the right 
to be given a say in the important climate policy decisions facing a country (Carvalho and 
Peterson, 2012). Hence, participation is not only necessary in order to solve critical policy 
problems like climate change but becomes the normative means by which a more 
democratically accountable, and thereby better society can be built (ibid).  Finally, Article 
12 of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement explicitly commits parties to enhance public 
participation in order to improve delivery of the actions detailed by the Agreement 
(UNFCCC, 2015)  
 
Despite these strong and diverse grounds for public involvement, there appears to be little 
research as to whether public engagement is a key part of the strategy bringing about 
changes to climate and energy policy (Gough, 2013; Warren, 2014; Capstick et al., 2015). 
One of the reasons for this may be implicitly or explicitly held views that public 
engagement is not, in fact, seen as a desirable, or indeed, necessary part of national 
transitions. Although the requirement for public engagement is therefore recognised 
theoretically, to our knowledge there has been no assessment of whether those acting as 
intermediaries between the policy making process and the public consider citizen 
involvement a central objective of climate policy, how they view trade-offs between public 
engagement and other goals of climate policy, and what forms of knowledge are employed 
in determining those choices. This we argue is a critical oversight: unless those working 
actively to develop policy themselves view public participation as important, it will gain 
minimal traction, and social science research on this topic may be disregarded. 
6 
 
 
2. Using knowledge exchange to develop research questions 
 
This paper provides insights into the perception of public engagement on climate change 
by intermediaries, based on collaborative research arising from a previous Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) knowledge exchange (KE) project, - the ‘Climate 
Crunch’ (Newell et al. 2015) - the aim of which was to promote dialogue between 
researchers and research users.  
The Climate Crunch programme identified key barriers to public engagement and effective 
action. These were: a) The ‘governance trap’ - whereby governments place responsibility 
on citizens, organisations and markets for action on climate change, while these in turn 
place responsibility back onto governments; b) Governments' failure to address the ways 
high-carbon lifestyles are shaped and reproduced; c) Limited stakeholder participation in 
climate policy deliberations, including those establishing the priorities and trade-offs that 
should govern transitions to a lower carbon society. Two of the solutions proposed in 
response to these barriers related to the role of public participation in climate policy, 
namely: 1) Developing a more inclusive and democratic process of deliberation regarding 
the trade-offs between economic growth and harm from climate change and 2) Ensuring 
decision making is transparent and procedural rights - rights to information, consultation 
and democratic inclusion in the decision-making process - are recognised and upheld 
(ibid). 
 
2.1 Building Grassroots Engagement with Climate Change. A Knowledge Exchange 
Partnership with the Fleming Policy Centre 
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This KE project sought to develop the Climate Crunch findings through engagement with 
a KE partner active in the area of climate policy where public participation was a core 
focus of the approach taken. The Fleming Policy Centre was chosen in this respect. This 
organisation was set up in 1996 to refine and promote a version of personal carbon trading 
known as Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs). This scheme is based on harnessing wide 
scale public innovation and participation in developing low carbon lifestyles, within a 
strong emissions reduction framework. While the scheme has received significant 
academic attention (e.g. Fawcett and Parag, 2010; Chamberlin et al. 2015) international 
media coverage and political support, one key obstacle to implementation is likely to be 
the lack of understanding of the potential role the public could play – and which TEQs 
could unleash. In the words of the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 
(2008:3) “what is needed, urgently, is a shift in the debate away from ever-deeper and 
more detailed consideration of how [TEQs] could operate towards the more decisive 
questions of how it could be made publicly and politically acceptable.” Hence the 
objectives of the Fleming Policy Centre were closely aligned to the goals of the KE project, 
inasmuch as a key objective was to understand participants’ perspectives on the extent 
to which public engagement is a necessary and/or desirable condition for policy 
development.  
Knowledge exchange workshops were held with the Fleming Centre to co-design a 
collaborative research agenda and methodology.  Our core research questions were 
agreed as follows: 
 
1) Do those acting as intermediaries between the policy making process and the public 
consider public involvement a central objective of climate policy? 
2) How do intermediaries view trade-offs between public engagement and other goals of 
climate policy? 
3) What forms of knowledge are employed in determining those choices? 
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3. Methodology 
 
As outlined, climate change policy intermediaries are key to how both policy makers and 
other actors interpret and integrate the role of public engagement in climate change. They 
therefore provided the sample under consideration, offering a critical lens on systemic 
views of public engagement involvement.  
The research followed a two-stage qualitative process. The first stage comprised 11 semi-
structured interviews with senior actors working on climate change issues, including 
NGOs, academics and energy businesses - both the renewables sector and from large 
electricity providers. The design of the second stage of the research was informed by 
themes arising from these initial interviews; this second stage employed deliberative 
roundtable seminars with a total of 41 public-facing intermediaries. Participants in this 
second group differed from the first in being made up largely of people with additional 
direct experience of working with the public on climate change issues, either as 
campaigners or businesses.  
Table 1: Key features of seminar participants 
 
The frame of reference used for all stages was comparison of policy options with the 
capacity to meet the targets laid out in the carbon budgets, as produced by the UK’s 
Committee on Climate Change. 
3.1 Stakeholder interviews 
 
Interviews were carried out with senior institutional actors from civil service and 
government (three interviewees); academia (two interviewees); energy companies (two 
interviewees), senior management of community energy groups (two interviewees) and 
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environmental non-government organisations (NGOs) (two interviewees). Interviewees 
were selected on the basis of their seniority and experience and included an ex UK cabinet 
minister, an ex Chief Executive of one of the largest UK energy companies, a director of 
a prominent energy consultancy, a senior member of the UK Climate Change Committee, 
and long serving senior campaigners from well-known environmental NGOs. All interviews 
were conducted by telephone between September and December 2014, and lasted 
between 30 and 60 minutes (see Supplemental Information for the schedule used for the 
semi-structured interviews). Interviewees were identified initially through a process of 
convenience sampling, via established networks of the research partners, and snowball 
sampling. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
 
3.2 KE research seminars 
 
Following analysis of the interviews, deliberative format seminars were carried out to 
provide a space in which to explore the view of a wider group of intermediary participants 
regarding public engagement in climate policy. Each workshop involved reflection on four 
policy frameworks: TEQs, carbon taxation, cap-and-dividend, and command-and-control 
(see Table 2).  
KE research seminars were held in London, Bristol and Brighton with representatives from 
civil society, the public sector, ‘green’ industry and environmental NGOs. These were 
recruited through a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling. London was chosen 
as a location which maximised the ability to obtain input from senior actors from the above 
sectors. Bristol and Brighton were chosen because of the high level of knowledge and 
established networks of climate change and community energy organisations. The 
formats of the seminars/focus groups were adjusted to the constraints of the time 
available; a World Café at the half day seminar in London and round table discussions at 
two shorter evening events in Bristol and Brighton.  
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To enable a balanced comparison, all four frameworks were presented at the seminars 
as scenarios which delivered the UK Climate Change Act targets. Although all four policy 
frameworks take the 80% emissions reduction goal as an immutable outcome, these 
policy proposals differ substantially in the assumed role of the public. Given the 
complexities of each approach, they were not presented in full detail. Instead the policies 
were presented at a level sufficient to articulate their key features, as well as the likely role 
of public engagement, in order to provoke discussion and deliberation. The summaries in 
Table 2 are shorter than the text discussed in the seminars and are provided here for 
illustration. Full texts are provided in supplemental information to this paper. The full texts 
were shared with participants prior to the seminars, and they were asked to read them in 
advance of the seminars. 
Table 2: Policy scenarios considered in deliberative discussions 
 
As the aim was to elicit normative views on public engagement, which may be subject to 
socially desirable responding (Paulhas, 2002), discussions in the seminars were 
structured around the following questions: 
● What do you see as the advantages of this approach? 
● What do you see as the disadvantages? 
● What other features would improve this scenario? 
 
Participants were also asked to complete a short survey where they were asked to indicate 
levels of favourability for each policy under five key pre-determined criteria: stimulates 
innovation; compatible with economic growth; progressive and equitable; will reduce 
energy demand; politically feasible. In addition, participants were asked to rank the policy 
frameworks overall and give reasons for their choices.  
Table 3 summarises the seminar structures. 
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Table 3: KE seminar structure 
 
4. Results 
4.1 One-to-one interviews 
 
The interviews revealed a commonly held belief that a ‘climate silence’ has descended 
upon the UK, whereby climate change was considered to have been relegated in 
importance and rarely discussed by policy-makers (Corner, 2014). One participant noted 
that climate change was: “a more live issue a few years ago, when David Miliband was 
offering an ‘open ear’ on the subject” (Academic researcher). Similarly, a senior 
campaigner noted that:  
“there is zero public visibility for current government climate initiatives, 
no public facing narrative that we are in for a long term generational 
challenge.”  
 
Another senior campaigner suggested governments were marginalising discussions of 
climate change in favour of an energy security frame. An ex-cabinet minister confirmed 
that the government wants to keep a low profile on climate change policy. This participant 
stressed that this wasn’t to say the government weren’t taking action on climate change, 
however they were not being explicit that actions were being taken because of climate 
change. This self-imposed silence was also apparent in interviews with other 
intermediaries. A business consultant, working in the south west of England, stressed that 
in the project he was working on, they avoided discussing climate change and carbon 
reduction, based on the premise that it would not engage and motivate their audience. 
Instead, their discussions were presented as being much more about greening operations 
through energy efficiency and waste reduction.  
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Several respondents suggested that the public conversation around climate change has 
become so muted and peripheral that there was likely little chance the public would 
understand why access to energy was being managed through a framework, such as 
TEQs. This is illustrated by the remark from a private sector participant, who noted that: 
“We are failing to communicate the need for radical action to reduce emissions. We need 
to build a narrative from the bottom up” (Business consultant). Consequently, a policy 
framework with a big impact on the public such as TEQs was seen as “a case of running 
before we have learnt how to walk” (Ex-cabinet minister). Such is the extent of the climate 
silence that one interviewee suggested “it would be odd to be talking to the public about 
any climate policy at the moment” let alone something as radical as TEQs” (Campaigner).  
 
A senior civil servant we interviewed reported that the financial crash of 2008 had changed 
the political landscape in such a way as to have facilitated this ‘climate silence’:  
 
“Things have moved on since we passed the Climate Change Act. 
Recession, higher energy prices, higher energy bills for households 
and business, more pressure on households. So discourse reflects this 
and has moved on. It’s more about energy efficiency, keeping bills 
down, competitiveness. It is less about building a strong case around 
climate change.” 
 
Representatives from business and policy generally supported a top-down approach, 
which would allow delivery of the Climate Change targets without needing to involve the 
public in the decision-making process. An ex-Chief Executive of a major energy company 
said he wouldn’t necessarily talk about it as a climate change problem: 
 
“firstly because that debate is not going anywhere currently, but also because 
people think wind farms and other undesirable consequences when they think 
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about climate change, and lastly because sustainable living is about more 
than just climate change.”  
 
Table 4: Summary of core themes from interviews 
 
4.2 Knowledge Exchange Seminars 
The following sections outline the results from a thematic analysis of the data from 
across the three seminars, addressing each of the research objectives in turn. The data 
is comprised of transcriptions of recordings of the discussions combined with written 
comments provided when participants were completing the surveys. Themes emerging 
from the analysis are introduced and then selected quotes are provided which exemplify 
the emerging perspectives. 
 
4.2.1 Do those acting as intermediaries between the policy making process and the 
public consider public involvement a central objective of climate policy? 
 
Overall, public involvement was not considered to be a central or desirable 
objective of climate policy. Three reasons emerged. The first was the 
perception that sustained support and engagement from the public was not 
something that could be built from the bottom up. Rather, public opinion is 
merely a reflection of media discourses and the appropriate political cues  
“TEQs are open to abuse – you can see the Daily Mail headline 
‘Asylum seekers stole my carbon.’”  Campaigner, Brighton 
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“I’m afraid it’s driven by political perception more than the reality 
amongst the ordinary population. The politicians are the thing that make 
[policy proposals] publicly acceptable or not.” Business person, Bristol 
The second reason that public involvement in climate policy was seen as 
undesirable related to a lack of trust between experts and the public. In relation to 
TEQs a participant noted: 
“It feels like big brother are watching you again and I don’t think people are 
going to like it, having to clock-in and clock-out every time you do 
something.” Campaigner, Bristol  
   
The third reason for avoiding public involvement was the perceived lack of 
readiness of the public for accepting strong policy interventions.  
 
“The options are more likely to frighten people than solve the problem.” 
Campaigner, Bristol 
 
“I’m not sure I necessarily go along with the idea that the public are pushing 
for change and the politicians are misreading the public movement”. 
Campaigner, London 
 
One participant, whose work involved running public engagement activities, re-framed 
TEQs, which is intended to achieve increased public ownership of decisions, as feasible 
only under the condition that it simplified decision-making for people by reducing choice: 
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“We see time and time again the public saying ‘just tell us what to do!’ 
It’s not education with lots of bits of paper - just tell me what to do and if 
it is giving me a card, is that my one thing? Well I’ll do it!”  
Researcher, Bristol  
4.2.2 How do intermediaries view trade-offs between public engagement and other 
goals of climate policy  
 
Reflecting the views expressed in the one-to-one interviews, public engagement as a 
specific policy ideal was seen to be largely irrelevant compared to issues of feasibility. 
Here themes of political feasibility (political will), economic feasibility and technical 
feasibility emerged. As the same time, divergent views on the role and nature of desirable 
public engagement could be inferred from these feasibility discussions. 
 
Political feasibility  
 
Unsurprisingly, there was felt to be little incentive for political leaders to implement policies 
that may be perceived to create adverse reactions from business and the public. This was 
judged to be related to the perception of policy–makers regarding what the public wanted 
as well as fears of public response based on past experiences: 
“My concern would be that, in a sense, all of these would require quite 
heavy-handed government intervention and legislation. As such, it is 
hard to see how any present government (or any likely alternative in 
2020) would go for them.” Policy/science advisor, London  
 
“I’m afraid it’s (the agenda for delivering on climate targets) driven by 
political perception more than the reality amongst the ordinary 
population.” Campaigner, Bristol 
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“They have tried to do this before on a European level, and it turned into 
the Emissions Trading Scheme. Economists said they had never seen a 
business lobby react with such ferocity as in response to the ETS”. 
Economist, London 
 
Justice and equity were also identified as core political principles which should not be 
compromised, and in many ways were the issues generating most comment. The 
primary concern regarding public acceptability was fairness. Successful public 
engagement was viewed as dependent on identifying a scheme that would not  
exacerbate disadvantage. All the policy scenarios were seen as lacking the ability to 
deliver just and equitable outcomes but it was TEQs, which is designed to address 
hidden issues around social justice and emissions, which was singled out for criticism.  
“So if you’re rich enough you could drive your SUV everywhere, you 
could leave it running all night, it wouldn’t matter that would be fine”. 
Campaigner, Brighton  
“This is using a mechanism where the rich can escape from those who 
can’t.  It feels like it’s even magnifying the situation we have now rather 
than actually changing something.” Campaigner, Bristol 
 
Concerns about fairness were also expressed in relation to the UK acting 
unilaterally on carbon emission programmes: 
 
“Why are we doing this [taking ambitious action on climate change] 
when someone else isn’t? There’s always going to be that issue.” 
Researcher, Brighton 
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As one participant noted, when reflecting on her work with the public, what she heard 
discussants say was the most important consideration in discussing policy “was always 
fairness - in every single project I do fairness is maximum. It’s right up in the top 3.” 
This suggests that as fairness was a critical consideration, any aspect of policy that was 
lacking in this regard was seen as lacking the potential for public involvement.  
Technical feasibility 
 
The concerns here were that for a policy framework such as TEQs, the country, and its 
institutions, simply were not in a position to create a system capable of managing such a 
complex policy intervention. Not only was it unlikely that such a system could be created, 
past failures meant there would likely not be the willingness to even try. 
 
“For 20 years the NHS tried to organise a centralised IT system. An IT 
system that’s going to be at every point of sale for every person is a 
logistical nightmare. It’s doomed to fail from the outset.”  Business 
person, Brighton 
 
Following the publicised failings of the Green Deal, concerns were expressed 
over assumptions made about the technical feasibility of improving energy 
efficiency within homes and buildings. 
 
“In practical terms the number of houses that can be insulated 
correctly is much lower than we like to think it is, at the moment the 
technologies just aren’t there.” Community activist, Bristol 
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Although technical feasibility was considered in its own right, the sense was also 
expressed that such issues could lead to a lack of trust that could undermine any policy 
approach that sought public engagement and support.  
 
Economic feasibility  
 
Extending the discussions of fairness and equity, many participants saw the ability to 
live a low-carbon lifestyle as simply beyond the financial means of many people, or at 
least, that this would be the perception of many on low incomes. This indicates a view 
that the public cannot afford to engage and that this needs to be addressed first: 
 
“The same person who can’t even afford the change to lower energy light 
bulbs, let alone changing all their light fittings to halogens isn’t going to be 
able to take advantage of schemes for reducing energy, even if they’ve 
got a real passion for this stuff”. Local Government Officer, London 
 
“We saw this with the way in which the opposition and then the 
government undermined the confidence in carbon taxes by saying this is 
adding to your price; we suddenly saw the environment being a burden on 
people rather than actually something worth protecting and I think we will 
see a scenario frighteningly saying you will have a quota you will be taxed, 
people will turn around and say well I’m not going to do anything about it 
you put it off for one year, two years, three years anyway.” Economist, 
London 
 
Democratic ideals 
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The desire for any climate policy framework to embody the principles of public 
engagement was cited as an important goal, despite the tensions this created with 
the notion that the public were not up to the task of participating in the decisions 
about the UK’s energy choices.  
 
“These tools are all a means to an end. The ‘end’ is a sustainable future, but 
this is contested, so we need as much conversation and delineation about 
the future we want as possible. The tax and dividend approaches don’t 
facilitate this, whereas the TEQs and Command and Control do.” 
Campaigner, Brighton. 
 
“An overarching question for me is how the public(s) would be engaged in 
these options. Fundamentally it’s a political challenge and the need to 
catalyse political leadership. This needs to be looked at in a pragmatic way – 
what’s going to make sense to politicians and policymakers?” Researcher, 
London 
 
 
4.2.3 What forms of knowledge are employed in determining the choices made by 
workshop participants? 
 
In comparison to Bristol and Brighton the London seminar saw participants draw on 
specific examples from policy initiatives and campaigns to justify their perspectives on the 
feasibility of the scenarios being discussed, for example: 
 
“We did propose this ages ago with the Centre for Clean Air Policy and other 
people for the EU emissions trading scheme where you basically stick your 
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caps on energy imports or rather fossil fuel imports or where the stuff came 
out of the ground and when we took it to the European Commission they all 
said no, partly because you can’t tinker with it and the governments like to 
be able to tinker with things…” Civil servant, London 
 
The participants in Bristol and Brighton, many of whom were on the front line of 
campaigns, expressed the view that the policy frameworks were too complex to 
understand and compare, a sentiment voiced by some participants in London. They 
were more likely to draw on their own experiences or values when judging policy 
options.  
 “I think the consequences and ripple effects of all four options are 
probably too complex to give clear answers to the questions. The quick 
answers are therefore first order responses – emotional.” Consultant, 
Brighton 
Hence, there was a sense that preferences would be informed less by deliberation on 
evidence from the relevant social sciences on public attitudes to climate policy, in favour 
of participant’s own values: 
“I am in favour of TEQs but I may be the sort of person that would. A 
group of [campaigners] might be unrepresentative.” Campaigner, 
Brighton 
Other responses indicate that knowledge of the factor shaping public 
perceptions and attitudes around climate change were limited amongst 
many working in environmental campaigns. 
 “I don’t have the knowledge and don’t feel any of these offer a real 
solution.” Campaigner, Bristol 
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“I can’t speak to the technical side of things to that degree and I 
wouldn’t attempt to.” Researcher, Bristol 
Although this may be a consequence of the limitation of a seminar format, 
this replicates the reality of how even relatively informed people might view 
climate change policy options. 
 
4.3 Results: Policy scenario preferences 
 
After the seminar discussions, participants were asked to grade each of the four 
scenarios on a Likert scale from 1 to 7 against five criteria derived from the expert 
interviews and research literature. Figure 1 shows the results of the combined scores. 
These are not intended to provide statistically generalisable results, but as an indication 
of views of the participants. Responses (provided anonymously) indicate that the four 
policies in general were scored similarly for their potential to maintain economic growth 
and reduce energy demand, but that they were rated with more variability in terms of 
their political feasibility, equity and potential to stimulate innovation. In particular, the 
policy framework requiring least public engagement (command and control) was rated 
as most politically feasible, whereas the policy framework requiring most engagement 
(TEQs) was rated the least politically feasible. 
 
Figure 1: Results from 3 seminar: average participant ratings of the four 
scenarios on a Likert scale 1-7  
 
The participants were also asked to consider the four policy scenarios against two 
questions: ‘Which policy will be most assured at meeting the fourth carbon budget?” and 
“Which policy do you prefer”?   
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No strong preferences for any one policy proposal emerged from analysis of the 
answers given. Some participants felt that the current economic and political context 
meant that none of them could work alone, and that overall a mix of policies was 
required: 
“The ability of any one policy to meet carbon budgets depends on 
how well policies are structured. Each policy has different positive 
attributes. Mixes are needed, not mutually exclusive.” London 
“These schemes are compatible together but TEQs is the least feasible 
from a media/public perception point of view” Bristol 
 
5. Discussion 
Calls for participatory decision making and dialogue-based engagement on environmental 
science now date back more than 20 years (UNEP 1992). Since that time there has 
emerged a widespread acceptance that effective climate policies cannot exist 
independently of public engagement and debate about the societal implications of climate 
change, such that engagement has become a ‘buzzword’ (Carvalho et al. 2016) 
The knowledge exchange project discussed in this paper sought to take the temperature 
of the appetite for public participation amongst those acting as intermediaries between the 
public and policy in the UK, by asking to what extent intermediaries consider public 
involvement a central objective of climate policy, what were seen as acceptable 
compromises between the aspiration for public engagement and other goals of climate 
policy, and the forms of knowledge employed in determining those choices. 
 
The findings from both the seminars and the interviews failed to unearth any sense of 
enthusiasm for increasing public participation in climate policy decision-making. This 
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echoes the conclusions emerging from a large scale analysis of public attitudes to energy 
system change in the UK, namely that in respect of major energy transformations, an 
alternative to participatory forms of decision making are required (Butler et al. 2015). The 
reason given for reaching that conclusion that “public opinion is too susceptible to change 
to form a basis for decision-making. represents an indeterminate form of uncertainty.” 
(Butler et al, 2014: iii). This description characterises what seminar participants and 
interviewees told us – public support would be hard to win and easy to lose in the face of 
sustained political and media attacks on the policy. 
Trust has been identified as a ‘key perceptual short cut’ used by the public when forming 
opinions about complex and controversial topics such as climate change and climate 
change policy (Steentjes et al. 2017) and trust was identified as a key factor in the 
generation and maintenance of public support. The public were seen as unlikely to trust 
the intentions behind radical lifestyle changes that may be imposed on them. Nor was it 
felt that the public would trust the people who were asking them to make the changes. 
Businesses and the media could not be trusted to not distort the debate and undermine 
the case for taking action to reduce carbon emissions. Politicians and the public were 
unlikely to trust in the technical feasibility of the frameworks being discussed or the ability 
of the government to implement schemes effectively and equitably. This lack of trust 
worked both ways; the senior stakeholders interviewed at the beginning of this research 
did not trust the public to willingly and voluntarily adopt the attitudinal and behavioural 
changes needed to drive large scale reductions in energy use.  
Fairness, though not seen as a particularly strong feature of the four frameworks, was 
considered something of an antidote to the sense of mistrust permeating the public 
sphere.  However, the relationship between these two concepts was at times tautological, 
in so much as it wasn’t clear what needed to come first: increased trust such that people 
accepted claims of fairness, or demonstrations of fairness which would lead to increased 
levels of trust. Butler et al. (2015) found that the process of developing new low carbon 
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systems needed itself to be open, fair and attentive to the impacts of the proposed 
changes on people’s lives. In this sense none of the four frameworks were considered to 
be capable of solving this puzzle by virtue of being delivered as a fait accompli. Instead 
of delivering a fully worked out new framework for generating and using energy, policies 
for meeting climate targets should attend to the advantages conferred by a process of 
upstream engagement, that is engagement before significant research and development 
of a new technology has begun, public controversy about the topic is not currently present, 
and entrenched attitudes or social representations have not yet been established (Nisbet 
and Markowitz, 2016; Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007). 
 
In sum, the answer to the question, to what extent intermediaries consider public 
involvement a central objective of climate policy, is (asides from the one participant with 
experience of working in public engagement on complex policy issues), not a great deal. 
Instead, it was felt that the government needed to continue to lead efforts to decarbonise 
the energy system ‘behind the scenes’ whilst supporting the public in improving energy 
efficiency.  
As to the second research question, on what compromises between ideals of public 
engagement and the goals of climate policy were deemed acceptable, it is apparent that 
the compromise should be in favour of delivering targets at the expense of building 
public engagement. 
Regarding the forms of knowledge brought to bear on deliberating about the value of 
greater public involvement in delivery of climate targets, the majority of seminar 
participants drew not on professional experience but generic (largely negative) mental 
models of human nature and the political context. As noted at the beginning of this 
paper some three-quarters of the UK public favour reductions in energy use, decreased 
reliance on fossil fuels (Butler et al. 2015) and greater use of renewable energy such as 
onshore wind (10:10, 2016). Research also indicates a strong mandate for government 
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intervention (Capstick et al. 2015).  Yet what has emerged from the participants is a set 
of preferences which suggest governments will have to take action without waiting for the public 
to demand it. There was general recognition that the public, although perhaps not 
campaigning for action, indicate concern about the climate change when prompted. Yet 
this was not interpreted as meaning the public were seen as willing and able to take the 
lead in mitigating emissions, but instead are looking to and waiting for governments to 
take that role. It currently appears that intermediaries have strong reservations about 
any policy proposals in which the public are expected and intended to play more than a 
cursory role in addressing the climate change challenge. This runs counter to a wide 
range of research on the topic. That the one workshop participant with extensive 
experience of working with the public in deliberative forums was the only one to 
express a positive position on the ability of the public to participate in this process, 
indicates this. Consequently, an important goal of future engagement activities may be 
to bring facilitators and public engagement practitioners together with campaigners and 
other opinion formers to improve understanding of opportunities and challenges in 
improving public engagement with climate change, and of feasible policy options and 
their implications. 
 
5.1. Limitations of the research  
 
It must be acknowledged that the policy options presented in the seminars required 
difficult decisions to be made about what level of detail to include and what assumptions 
to make about elements of the scenarios, such as what technologies to include (for 
example excluding CCS), or what level to set carbon taxes. All these aspects were 
contested within the research team. However, as texts for elucidating participants’ 
perspectives on the desirability and feasibility of generating the levels of public 
engagement generally seen as desirable in much of the literature and documents 
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outlined previously, the frameworks functioned well. The process did not, however, 
create the conditions for reliable comparisons between the four diverse policy 
frameworks. 
 
The project was funded and designed as a Knowledge Exchange activity, rather than a 
research project. This has implications for the volume of data it was possible to accrue 
within the funding constraints. A full research project would have employed a mixed 
methods approach that combined these qualitative insights with a statistically 
representative survey. Despite these limits this analysis articulates an important but 
unexplored aspect of the participatory paradigm; namely that what is considered a 
positive ideal in the research community remains anathema to many outside of 
academia. This finding represents a concerning barrier to international governance 
bodies’ call for improved communication (e.g. as articulated in the COP21 Paris 
Agreement) and engagement activities at all levels of society.  
 
6. Conclusion  
These findings indicate that research on improving public engagement with the political 
process of formulating climate policy may be a fruitful avenue. Whilst a wealth of survey 
studies have shown widespread awareness and concern about climate change (Pidgeon, 
2012; Capstick et al. 2015) there is little research into how the public relate to the 
problem’s politics (Carvalho et al. 2016). Given that the issues emerging in this research 
were focused on themes of trust and fairness (essentially political issues) this is a neglect 
that should be addressed. Currently, the public report that formal political processes of 
knowledge and political structures are rather inaccessible to them (ibid). A way to spur 
engagement with the political dimensions of climate change will therefore be necessary if 
the current stand-off defined by the governance trap is to be overcome. 
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Whilst this work has provided important insights into how academic and international 
policy claims of the need for greater public participation in climate policy are rejected ‘on 
the ground’, it provides just a snapshot of the perceptual barriers to public engagement 
on climate change that may exist. We feel there would be a lot of value of repeating this 
work now following the Brexit vote and the election of Trump, with a specific focus on 
how to build the levels of trust needed to create durable, broad and deep public support 
for the policies needed to deliver the goals of the Climate Change Act. 
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